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Loneliness, a significant public health issue, was exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in disaster-prone regions like the U.S. Gulf Coast. This study examined how social and built environmental factors were associated with pandemic-related disruptions and loneliness among respondents from the third wave of the Survey of Trauma, Resilience, and Opportunity among Neighborhoods in the Gulf (STRONG). Using a retrospective measure of loneliness (pre-pandemic vs. during pandemic), we found that loneliness increased significantly during the pandemic. Using a measure of routine behavior disruptions and measures of both objective (e.g., parks, walkability, etc.) and subjective (e.g., neighborhood safety, social cohesion, etc.) environmental factors, we found that disruptions to daily routines strongly predicted higher loneliness, and subjective measures, such as neighborhood safety, social cohesion, and lacking post-disaster social support, were more salient predictors of loneliness than objective factors such as the number of parks in one’s neighborhood. Difficulty accessing green spaces and housing distress were linked to greater COVID-19 disruptions, indirectly contributing to loneliness. These findings highlight the importance of safe, supportive, and accessible social and physical environments in mitigating loneliness and enhancing community resilience during crises. 

ABSTRACT A cursory read of the popular press and the JDM research field suggest that they have very different beliefs regarding the consequences of confidence. And these beliefs have important consequences themselves. For individuals, how one views the consequences of confidence (and whether they are positive or negative) likely influences the extent to which one pursues the development of confidence and how one interprets confidence in others. For JDM researchers, their beliefs about the consequences of confidence inform research programs. For example, a belief that overconfidence leads to inappropriate medical treatments, legal advice, or investments suggests an emphasis on reducing overconfidence rather than on developing confidence. This paper aims to improve understanding of both the general public's and JDM researchers' beliefs about the consequences of confidence in knowledge. We present a general theoretical framework for thinking about the consequences of confidence, followed by two exploratory studies designed to access these beliefs, first with the general public and then with JDM researchers. We used structured, open‐ended questioning to generate a large dataset (over 10,000 responses) of potential consequences of low confidence, high confidence, overconfidence, and underconfidence. Qualitative coding identified a broad set of respondent‐generated beliefs regarding psychological and behavioral consequences, organized into antonym pairs (e.g., arrogant/high self‐image vs. low self‐image). Respondents made few distinctions between low confidence and underconfidence, viewing both negatively. However, the general public drew a sharp distinction between high confidence (described positively) and overconfidence (described negatively), a trend less prevalent among JDM researchers. 

Rationale To understand novel diseases, patients may draw comparisons to other diseases. Objective We examined whether mentally associating specific diseases with COVID-19 was related to self-reported protective behaviors early in the pandemic. Methods In March 2020, a national sample of 6534 U.S. adults listed diseases that came to mind when thinking of COVID-19. They self-reported protective behaviors, demographics, and COVID-19 risk perceptions. Results Participants associated COVID-19 with common infectious diseases like seasonal influenza (59%), common cold (11%), and pneumonia (10%), or emergent infectious diseases like pandemic influenza (28%), SARS/MERS (27%), and Ebola (14%). Seasonal influenza was most commonly mentioned, in all demographic groups. Participants mentioning seasonal influenza or common cold reported fewer protective behaviors. Those mentioning pneumonia or emergent infectious diseases reported more protective behaviors. Mentioning pneumonia, SARS/MERS, and Ebola was associated with the most protective behaviors, after accounting for other generated diseases, demographics, and risk perceptions (e.g., for avoiding crowds, OR = 1.52, 95% CI = 1.26, 1.83; OR = 1.28, 95% CI = 1.13, 1.46; OR = 1.30, 95% CI = 1.11, 1.52, respectively). Conclusions Early in the pandemic, most participants mentally associated COVID-19 with seasonal flu, which may have undermined willingness to protect themselves. To motivate behavior change, COVID-19 risk communications may need to mention diseases that resonate with people while retaining accuracy. 

Understanding public media channel preferences can inform preparedness plans, response strategies, and long-term recovery. However, questions remain about how media consumption changes across pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases. Past theories argue that media use may change for several reasons, including during times of societal conflict and challenge. These theories point to the belief that, during a crisis, we expect media channel use to change because media preferences during a crisis will be fundamentally different compared to everyday routines. This paper takes advantage of a survey fielded to Texas residents soon after Hurricane Harvey. Here we ask: (1) What media channels are most prominent in each crisis phase? and (2) Do media channel preferences change across crisis phases? We use simple descriptive statistics and chi-squares tests to describe media channel preferences across the three crisis phases by demographics. Additionally, we use alluvial diagrams to visualize media channel preferences over time. In total, 62% (n=174) of respondents reported no changes in channel preferences. However, chi-square tests identified significant differences in media use changes related to a handful of demographic characteristics. These findings are explored alongside theories that would hypothesize likely media use changes across pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis phases.